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1 Introduction
In the natural as well as in the social or psychological domain, puzzling phenom-
ena call for an explanation, and there is little doubt that the connection among
quantum events across spacetime - known as non-locality - is indeed puzzling.
Events that we might reasonably consider mutually independent, according to
our best theory of space and time, turn out to influence each other. But as soon
as we try to understand what this ‘influence’ could amount to, we find ourselves
in deep physical and philosophical troubles, and if we attempt to investigate
the connection between non-locality and causation, the situation may become
even more complicated. For if for the sake of the argument we assume we have
a vague intuition of what non-locality might be, several are the questions worth
asking. Is a causal view of non-locality itself possible? In particular, can the
nature of quantum non-locality be somehow clarified by viewing it as grounded
in some (perhaps unfamiliar) sort of causation? Which properties should this
∗Presented at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop Modality, Probability and Bell’s
Theorems, Cracow, Poland, August 19-23, 2001.
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sort of causation satisfy?
There are two preliminary and general circumstances that need to be taken
into account but that, at the same time, contribute to make the picture un-
clear. First, there seem to be different ways in which non-locality is manifested
in quantum mechanics. Second, the notion of causation itself is far from being
understood in an univocal and uncontroversial sense. The intuition according to
which the occurrence of a physical event A determines (produces, brings about,
raises the probability of, ...) the occurrence of a distinct physical event B -
in which case A is said to be the ‘cause’ of B - can be represented differently
in different causal theories. Within the physicists’ community, for instance,
it is assumed - tacitly or not - that events recognized to be causes must be
temporally prior to their alleged effects, and the causal doctrine based on this
assumption is sometimes referred to as ‘relativistic causality’. This terminology
is itself biased, however, since it takes for granted that special relativity provides
the strongest possible support for this assumption. In fact, a rich philosophical
debate has shown that if, more generally, the only requirement to be satisfied
is the impossibility of generating causal paradoxes, several causal theories may
be developed without assuming any temporal priority of causes. Moreover, dif-
ferent causal theories may have a differing degree of adequacy when applied to
the domain of microphysics. The evaluations that may be made of their ba-
sic causal principles according to different formulations and applications of the
principles themselves may widely differ, so that when one claims to defend or
counteract a causal view of non-locality, he should specify in advance what is
the causal theory in terms of which that view is supposed to be ‘causal’. A clear
demonstration of the interpretation-dependent character of causal notions is the
debate on Reichenbach’s common cause principle, according to which when two
events A and B are correlated, either there is a direct connection between A
and B producing the correlation or there is a different event C which causes the
correlation. On the basis of different intuitions and formal definitions, oppo-
site conclusions have been drawn on whether explanations of nonlocal quantum
correlations in terms of probabilistic common causes are an option or not. This
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circumstance strongly supports in my opinion the view expressed in [8], accord-
ing to which what is usually called the common cause principle “is not really a
principle but a schema of principles that calls for interpretation” (p. 53). 1 The
pluralism of formulations that both the notion of (non-)locality and the notion
of causation may assume in different theoretical frameworks can be considered
primarily as a logical problem. In the assessment of the status and significance
of a causal view of non-locality, however, we have first to take into account its
physical background, namely we have to take into account the investigations
on the physical meaning of non-locality in quantum mechanics. The standard
framework is that of EPR-Bell correlation experiments, involving a two spin-1/2
particles’ system S1 + S2 prepared in the singlet state, and such that the spin
measurements are performed when the two subsystems S1 and S2 occupy two
space-like separated spacetime regions R1 and R2, respectively, after leaving the
source. The common feature of these investigations is basically an assumption
of incompleteness for the purely quantum description of physical states; on the
basis of such assumption a ‘finer’ state description is postulated via the intro-
duction of extra (‘hidden’) variables that ‘add up’ to the quantum state. In
this vein the first step was to introduce deterministic hidden variable models, in
which the source state λ is postulated to be complete and assumed to determine
with certainty the outcome of any measurement that can be performed on the
two distant subsystems. Later the condition of determinism for hidden variables
has been relaxed. Stochastic hidden variable models were then introduced, in
which the state description λ allowed by the model enables one to determine
not the measurement outcome but only its probability of occurrence.
Both in the deterministic and stochastic frameworks, a locality condition is
usually motivated by a prescription of ‘lack of influence’ between the spacetime
regions in which the measurement events are localized, although the specific
condition of locality that was assumed in deterministic hidden variables mod-
els had to be reformulated in order to comply with the stochastic character of
1For a recent and general assessment of this issue, in addition to [8], cf. the chapter 3 of
[28].
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the more general model. The locality condition was then formulated as an in-
dependence constraint on the statistical predictions generated by the complete
descriptions of the single particles’ states (when the particles themselves are
spatially well separated). Namely, the assumption of the mutual independence
between the relevant spin measurement events was formulated as the invari-
ance of the probabilities prescribed by λ for any outcome in one wing of the
experiment under the change of some relevant parameter in the distant wing.
Consequently, several discussions focused on what different locality conditions
obtained when such parameter was taken to represent different things, typically
parameters pertaining either to apparatus settings or to outcomes of the mea-
surements. It is worth emphasizing that I refer here to hidden variables models,
and not to hidden variables theories, for a simple reason. In the history of the
hidden variables’ issue, the ‘theories’ in which more and more general locality
conditions were assumed - and whose predictions have been shown to be incon-
sistent with those of quantum mechanics - were in fact theories only as a fac¸on
de parler ; whereas the only full-fledged formal construction deserving the title
of theory, namely Bohmian mechanics, is explicitly nonlocal. 2
The greater generality of these stochastic hidden variables models should
make the conclusions drawn from them stronger. If locality is violated in these
models, the existence of non-local influences is strongly supported, and thus
their significance for the notion of causation can be investigated. However, even
this more general framework provides no clear answer to the following central
questions:
(a) How should the causal meaning of non-locality be assessed by the point of
view of the spacetime structure in which non-local correlations display them-
selves?
(b) Provided we adopt the most natural interpretation of probability in physics,
namely the relative frequency interpretation, and we do not turn to highly
controversial notions such as chances, propensities or dispositions, what might
2A recent detailed analysis of these and related issues is in [5,6].
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non-local correlations tell us about single events confined in bounded spacetime
regions? 3 This is why in the sequel, when I will discuss the status and signifi-
cance of causal relations within the issue of non-locality in quantum mechanics,
I will assume as a working hypothesis that causal relations may be analyzed as
holding among single events in spacetime, on the basis of processes that need not
refer to any recurrence in order to be considered ‘causal’. As every philosopher
of causation will immediately acknowledge, this assumption is somehow remi-
niscent of a singularist approach to causation, endorsed among others by such
eminent philosophers as C.J. Ducasse and G.E.M. Anscombe. In the singularist
view of causation
the cause of a particular event [is defined] in terms of but a single
occurrence of it, and thus in no way involves the supposition that
it, or one like it, ever has occurred before or ever will again. The
supposition of recurrence is thus wholly irrelevant to the meaning of
cause; that supposition is relevant only to the meaning of law. And
recurrence becomes related at all to causation only when a law is
considered which happens to be a generalization of facts themselves
individually causal to begin with. [...] The causal relation is essen-
tially a relation between concrete individual events; and it is only
so far as these events exhibit likeness to others, and can therefore
be grouped with them into kinds, that it is possible to pass from
individual causal facts to causal laws. ([15], pp. 129-30).
I wish to stress, however, that I am not embracing a preliminary philosoph-
ical position on causation, namely singularism, and then turning to argue that
3In [13] Dickson has questioned the adequacy of locality conditions based on probabilistic
independence when Bohmian mechanics is taken into account, and he argued that Bohmian
mechanics may be shown to satisfy or violate that kind of locality depending on how a specific
model of the theory is constructed This indicates, according to Dickson, that probabilistic
independence is not adequate to capture the meaning of locality. It is worth recalling that the
Dickson argument concerning the status of locality as probabilistic independence in Bohmian
mechanics has been challenged in [26].
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causation in quantum mechanics can only make sense if interpreted in singularist
terms. As I will discuss more in detail later, non-locality in quantum mechanics
involves a fundamental reference to counterfactual situations, and since non-
trivial counterfactuals are usually supposed to be grounded in laws supporting
them, an orthodox singularist might be already suspicious. The meaning I at-
tach to singularism is rather general and so is the motivation for adopting such
a viewpoint. If for the sake of my investigation I admit the a priori possibility
of discovering a totally new form of causation, that might explain the ‘action
at-a-distance’ allegedly entailed by non-locality (I briefly review the modalities
of such ‘action’ in section 2), I still conceive it to involve physical processes
connecting single events. That is, I incline to interpret this hypothetical cau-
sation as a sort of singular phenomenon, that is enhanced by the actualization
of a property instantiated by a physical event and that affects the actualization
of different properties pertaining distant events. The causal action displayed
by this phenomenon should thus be understood as taking place in spacetime in
some well-specified sense, although clearly not as a process propagating contin-
uously in spacetime ([7]). So the question is: how and to what extent can this
unfamiliar causation be interpreted consistently with the more familiar space-
time structure in which - according to our well-established physical theories -
single physical events live?
Within ordinary quantum mechanics - namely quantum mechanics with state
reduction - a reasonable starting point for addressing the problem is in my opin-
ion is to consider the implications of this singularist view on non-locality and
causation when the state reduction is taken into due account. In the usual in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics, state reduction is not only included among
the basic postulates of the theory but is also assumed to be a real physical
process. In this interpretation, it is state reduction that is supposed to actual-
ize most properties of quantum systems, and this is a very general motivation
for pursuing an analysis of the conceptual link between causation and state
reduction. But there is also a more specific motivation for the study of such
link. The events that might be causally connected are assumed to be located
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at space-like separated regions: thus if we take seriously - as we should - the
spacetime geometry that underlies this assumption (something that Maudlin
calls the relativistic constraint : see [25], pp. 290-2), then we also have to take
into account at least some ways out of the problem of the non-covariance of
the state reduction process in relativistic quantum mechanics. In particular,
in view of this problem, section 3 is devoted to the exploration of some of the
implications that different assumptions on where the state reduction occurs may
have on the link causation-reduction. 4 In following this line of analysis I do
not assume, however, that a causal view of non-locality cannot be evaluated in
a quantum theory without state reduction. Although for obvious reasons I will
not take into account all no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, in
section 4 I will consider what might be the place occupied by causation in stan-
dard Bohmian mechanics. Finally, some tentative conclusions on the prospects
of a causal view of non-locality are summarised.
2 Non-Locality, Superluminal Dependence and
Causation
Having reasons to believe that, given two events A and B, their occurrences
depend on (or influence or affect) one another, is not sufficient in general to
claim that A and B are causally connected. On the other hand, a mutual
dependence between A and B is a good reason for us to search whether such
dependence is grounded in some underlying causal mechanism, so far unknown
to us. In the context of the EPR-Bell correlations in quantum mechanics, the
events under consideration are assumed to be space-like separated, so that the
search for causation in this context is a search for a superluminal causation,
pursued under the assumption that our quantum-mechanical events display at
4 For the sake of the present discussion, I assume such notions as property or emergence as
uncontroversial. Of course they are not, but in my opinion it is anyway doubtful that a purely
philosophical analysis of such notions could substantially contribute to a better understanding
of the main issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
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least a superluminal dependence.
In order then to investigate whether long distance correlations in EPR-Bell
experiments deserve to be called causal, it is convenient to briefly review the
reason why in ordinary quantum mechanics such correlations can be in fact
regarded as an instance of superluminal dependence between events that in a
purely relativistic perspective should be taken to be mutually independent. For
the sake of simplicity, I will assume here that performing a measurement and de-
tecting an outcome are not distinct events: the terms of the hypothetical causal
connection that I wish to investigate are then to be meant as measurement-and-
outcome events.
In a standard EPR-Bell correlation experiment involving a two spin-1/2
particles’ system S1 + S2 prepared in the singlet state, we know that the spin
measurements are supposed to be performed when S1 and S2 occupy two space-
like separated spacetime regions R1 and R2, respectively. Under the hypothesis
that quantum predictions are correct, S1 and S2 exhibit a perfect spin correla-
tion, namely if the outcome of an actual measurement of the spin up along any
direction x for the particle S1 is +1, the probability of obtaining −1 as outcome
of the measurement of the spin up along the direction x for the particle S2
equals 1. Hence, we may say that had the measurement of the spin up along
any direction x for the particle S1 come out −1, we would have obtained with
certainty +1 for S2. However, in ordinary quantum mechanics the measurement
process is stochastic, namely from identical preparations we may obtain differ-
ent outcomes: the spin of S1 can be either +1 or −1 in different runs also when
the whole set of events causally relevant to obtaining +1 or −1, localized in the
backward light cone of the that event, is exactly the same. But if S1 and S2
are shown to be perfectly correlated in their outcomes, either there is a direct
dependence between the two measurements, performed in the space-like sepa-
rated regions R1 and R2, or there is an dependence between the measurement
of S1 [S2] and some event in the backward light cone of S2 [S1], and in both
cases the dependence holds between space-like separated events, namely it is
superluminal (cfr. [24], pp. 128-136, and [25], pp. 285-289). Moreover, due to
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the Bell theorem, any theory assuming the existence of events or factors that (i)
are causally relevant to obtaining +1 or −1 for S1 [S2], (ii) are located in the
backward light cone of S1 [S2], and (iii) screen off the causal relevance which is
in the backward light cone of S1 [S2] (but not in the overlap of the backward
light cones of S1 and S2), is bound to give predictions that disagree with those
of quantum mechanics. 5
Before going on, a pair of remarks concerning possible objections to the above
argument in favor of superluminal dependence. First, it is worth stressing that
in the above argument counterfactuals are involved just to express the content
of the spin strict correlation property, whereas the locality condition that is
presupposed is expressed in terms of the invariance - across possible different
runs of the experiment - of the light cone structure of the events that are causally
relevant to obtaining a given outcome. The latter condition is independent in
principle from any sort of counterfactual locality condition, such as ‘the outcome
of a measurement on S2 of the spin x-component would have been still +1,
had the spin component been measured on S1 in the z-direction instead of the
x-direction’, a formulation which is exposed to the objection of having non-
contextuality tacitly built in: in fact there is no reason why the measurement
on S2 of the spin component in a given direction should have the same outcome
when in different runs of the experiment it is measured with observables of S1
that are mutually incompatible. Second, the above argument does not rely on
the assumption that, after a measurement has been performed and an outcome
obtained, there is necessarily a value of the measured system that corresponds
to the outcome (and hence that, after the completion of the measurement, the
measured system satisfies the definite property of having that value). Namely,
the argument holds also if we just assume that, after the completion of the
measurement, the outcomes +1 and −1 are definite properties of the measuring
5As should be clear from the above account, the stochastic nature of the measurement
process makes the instance of superluminal dependence even more perspicuous. On the dif-
ficulties of making sense of locality - and of the superluminal dependence that its violation
would imply - in a strictly deterministic theory, see [13], [14] and [26].
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apparatuses.
The relation between outcomes of spin measurements in EPR-Bell correla-
tion experiments is then an instance of superluminal dependence. Such terms as
‘dependence’ or ‘influence’ are admittedly vague, however, so that the attempt
to elaborate arguments by which we could legitimately interpret superluminal
dependence as a form of causation appear at first completely reasonable. In
addition, there are already well-developed theories of causation at our disposal,
and in principle we are able to analyze the viability of their main assumptions
and conditions by the particular viewpoint of the nature of the dependence
between distant quantum events.
According to Maudlin’s terminology, for instance, correlated events like the
outcomes of EPR-Bell correlation experiments are causally implicated with each
other, a formulation that is supposed to suggest that the causal implication need
not distinguish causes from effects, and it may hold between events neither of
which is a direct cause of the other ([24]). The generality of the definition has a
non trivial justification. If we decide to adopt or develop a more sophisticated
theory of causation, in which more stringent conditions on the identification of
causes and effects are required, we immediately run into difficulties: due to the
space-like separation between the dependent events, the time ordering between
them is non-invariant across different Lorentz frames. A first option is trying to
dissolve the problem, rather than solving it, by arguing that the very distinction
between cause and effect is hardly applicable to EPR-Bell frameworks. This
position, albeit logically consistent, seems to imply that we do not need even
to stipulate what are the terms of the allegedly causal relation that we are
investigating. I will not discuss this option further since I doubt that anything
relevant to a decent notion of causation is left in it. A second option is to
retain the distinction between cause and effect, but to argue that it is the
very time ordering associated to any Lorentz frame that defines which is the
cause and which the effect. In this option the cause-effect distinction is thus
not rejected but is remarkably weakened, since it acquires itself the status of a
frame dependent distinction.
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No matter which of the first two preceding options is adopted, however, the
superluminal dependence between EPR-Bell outcomes appears to be ‘causal’ in
such a weak sense as to prompt the question: having acknowledged that EPR-
Bell outcomes are somehow connected across spacetime, do we really obtain
any deep insight by calling ‘causation’ that connection? Or rather what we are
doing when we say that the EPR-Bell outcomes are ‘causally implicated with
each other’ is nothing but saying that ‘connected events are connected’? If the
non-invariance of the time ordering between the connected events forces us to
abandon such typical conditions on causal relations as the temporal priority of
the cause, or less typical but still reasonable conditions such as simultaneity
between cause and effect, the features of this link are themselves so vague that
we should not be worried by the vagueness of the non-causal terms - namely
‘dependence, ‘influence’ and the like - that we might use to denote it: using
causal concepts in this case appears then to be a mere labeling devoid of any
real physical and philosophical significance.
3 Causation and State Reduction
The options considered so far appear to share an additional drawback, namely
that they do not take into due account the role of the state reduction process.
For in EPR-Bell frameworks, the mark of a relation that we might consider
causal between the two outcomes is the emergence of actual properties of the
system on one wing, as a consequence of obtaining a certain outcome after
measuring an observable of the system on the other wing. But in ordinary
quantum mechanics the process itself through which such properties emerge
is exactly the state reduction, so that it is sensible to investigate this notion
of causation at-a-distance yet to be characterized on the background of the
reduction process. Under the assumption that the state reduction is a real
physical process (that, as it stands, lacks Lorentz covariance), there are different
options on where the state reduction might take place and, in view of the above
mentioned causation-reduction link, we should take into account how a notion
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of causation - even very general - fares with respect with the different accounts
on where the state reduction occurs.
In an early investigation on the non-covariance of the state reduction pro-
cess, Bloch argued that the hypersurface on which the state reduction may be
taken to occur can be chosen arbitrarily, since that choice will not affect the
probability distribution of all (local) observables. This prescription is clearly
non-covariant, but in a relativistic quantum theory of measurement “it appears
that either causality or Lorentz covariance of wave functions must be sacrificed
[...] Covariance seems the smaller sacrifice, since it is apparently not required
for the calculation of invariant probabilities.” ([11], p. 1384). This argument
might provide a motivation for one of the above mentioned options, according
to which it is the very time ordering associated to any Lorentz frame that de-
fines which is the cause and which the effect. If for instance one performs a
measurement in an EPR-Bell correlation experiment, it can be assumed in the
Bloch spirit that the state reduction occurs along a space-like hyperplane con-
taining the measurement event in the frame of the observer who performed the
measurement. In a later paper Hellwig and Kraus, although still emphasizing
that what matters are just probability distributions since these are insensitive
to the Lorentz frame adopted to order the events, have proposed a prescription
according to which the reduction occurs along the backward light cone of the
measurement event ([23]).
In a series of papers Aharonov and Albert have shown that, although Lorentz-
covariant, the Hellwig-Kraus prescription turns out to be inadequate when non-
local observables are taken into account, namely observables of just such com-
posite systems as those considered in EPR-Bell correlation experiments ([1]-[3]).
But also without addressing the Aharonov and Albert criticisms (the debate is
still alive: see for instance [27], [17] and [20]), the very fact which the Bloch non-
covariant prescription and the Hellwig-Kraus covariant one rely on is unsatisfac-
tory by my specific point of view. Namely, the fact that the expectation values
of the considered observables - be they local or non-local - are invariant across
different Lorentz frames tells us nothing that might be relevant to explaining
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the superluminal dependence between single events and perhaps to interpreting
it in causal terms. Moreover, as far as just expectations values are taken into
account, quantum mechanics does satisfy statistical locality in the sense that in
a typical EPR-Bell correlation experiment, for instance, the expectation value
of a spin observable pertaining one subsystem is completely unaffected by any
kind of operation performed on the distant subsystem ([16], [21]). Therefore,
should we confine our attention to the level of expectation values, the very non-
locality problem (and the correlated one of attempting a causal interpretation
of it) would not even arise. But there is a further consequence of the Aharonov-
Albert analysis that turns out to be relevant by our viewpoint, namely the
revision of the usual meaning ascribed to the wave function in a relativistic con-
text. According to their proposal, when a local measurement is performed at
a spacetime point S, the state reduction should be taken to occur along every
space-like hyperplane intersecting S. In addition to the Lorentz-covariance that
this proposal allows one to achieve, it implies that the state of the system in
a relativistic quantum-mechanical context must be represented as a functional
defined on the set of space-like hyperplanes, so that in turn the ordinary wave
function takes on different values at a given spacetime point according to which
space-like hyperplane is considered ([3], pp. 231-2). By the point of view of
causal relations between events, however, this implies that certain events - that
might play the role of ‘causes’ and that are given by wave functions taking on
definite values at spacetime points - are actual in certain hyperplanes and not
in others. This leads us back to the starting point: also in a relativistic account
of the state reduction process such as the Aharonov-Albert one, there seem
to be no room for a characterization of causation that goes beyond a merely
verbal elaboration of the circumstance that certain events manifest a mutual
connection different in important respects from all other physical forces known
in nature. 6 More generally, in the shift to relativistic quantum mechanics,
6The fact that the ordinary wave function takes on different values at a given spacetime
point according to which space-like hyperplane is considered, following from the generalization
of the state as represented by a functional on the set of space-like hyperplanes, has analogies
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there is a circumstance that Aharonov and Albert emphasize and that seems
to be forced upon us by the attempt of finding a Lorentz-covariant formulation
of the measurement process: the theory preserves the capacity of prescribing
the correct probabilities for measurement outcomes, but not the capacity of
attributing definite states to the physical systems whose outcome probabilities
are evaluated. If this is the case, the prospects of a causal view of the relation
holding between the correlated outcome events in EPR-Bell correlation experi-
ments appear rather dim also in a relativistic quantum-mechanical context: it
is problematic to think of EPR-Bell events as causally connected when these
events should be represented as instances of properties satisfied by the suitable
physical systems, but in fact no definite ordinary state can be attributed to the
latter.
4 Spacetime Foliation, Bohmian Mechanics and
Causation
In ordinary quantum mechanics (i.e. quantum mechanics with state reduction),
there would be in principle a further option that we did not consider so far:
a preferred foliation of spacetime might be explicitly assumed, with respect to
which it would be perfectly determinate which events are causes and which
effects. This would amount, however, to a violation de facto of the above men-
tioned relativistic constraint, since in this case the space-like separation between
the causally connected events would be only a phenomenological relation. More-
over, the only reason for such a strong assumption would be just to make room
for space-like causation. This move would also have the somewhat ironic conse-
quence that, in order to explain a deeply non-classical feature like a fundamental
physical relation between space-like separated events, deeply pre-relativistic fea-
with the Fleming hyperplane dependence approach to quantum states ([18], [19]). It seems
to me that the status of causation in the Fleming approach would be similar to that in the
Aharonov-Albert approach, but this point deserves further investigations.
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tures like the absoluteness of the time ordering between the events themselves
are reintroduced.
The situation is different for Bohmian mechanics, whose overall structure
may provide independent (and deeper) reasons for justifying the assumption of
a preferred foliation of spacetime. As it stands, Bohmian mechanics is not a
Lorentz-invariant theory. In the general case of a N -particles system, the guid-
ance equation - the only dynamical law added by the theory to the Schro¨dinger
equation - concerns the positions of the N particles at a common and absolute
time: this presupposes the assumption of a foliation of spacetime into space-like
hyperplanes that, however, turns out to be impossible to determine. In this
context, a causal interpretation of non-locality appears rather natural, since a
causal relation between the EPR-Bell events might be then assumed to hold
just with respect to the foliation. If one is willing to accept that the democ-
racy reigning among Lorentz frames, prescribed by special relativity, is to be
meant just as a phenomenological circumstance - as David Albert put it, “taking
Bohm’s theory seriously will entail being instrumentalist about special relativ-
ity” ([4], p. 161, emphasis in the original) - then a notion of space-like causation
linking EPR-Bell events may very well be accomodated into Bohmian mechan-
ics. Admittedly, it would be quite an unconventional sort of causation, since
it would share with the foliation (and with all quantities defined with respect
to it) an epistemic inaccessibility: in this picture, we know that causation is
there, although we are bound to remain ignorant about its mechanisms and
about which events are ‘causes’ and which ’effects’. It is also true, however,
that a supporter of Bohmian mechanics need not being particularly worried by
this circumstance, rather disturbing for others. In fact he should find it rela-
tively easy to accomodate it within the framework of Bohmian mechanics, since
fundamental beables of the theory - in Bell’s terminology - like the particles’
positions and trajectories are themselves out of reach. As aptly pointed out by
Maudlin, “if the existence of empirically inaccessible physical facts is fatal, then
Bohmian mechanics is a non-starter even before Relativity comes into play”
([25], p. 296).
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It has been argued that in Bohmian mechanics the essential symmetry of
the possibly causal relations between two typical EPR-Bell subsystems - when
for instance the position of one particle causes the velocity of the other, which
is space-like separated from the first - makes it difficult to speak of a serious
‘causal’ influence between the systems ([13], p. 325). This argument presup-
poses that in order for a notion of causal influence to be meaningful, a direction
is to be selected along which the influence is supposed to act. Once we assume
a preferred foliation of spacetime in the spirit of Bohmian mechanics, however,
we need not hold on to a notion of causation in which an event A, in order to be
causally related to a different event B, must temporally precede B with respect
to the preferred time ordering. We can envisage a sort of causal implication
between events similar to that discussed by Maudlin for ordinary quantum me-
chanics, the only relevant difference being that in Bohmian mechanics we can
correctly interpret it as a simultaneous and mutual causal influence, since we
have assumed a privileged time ordering.
The logical possibility of admitting causal relations between space-like sep-
arated events, allowed by the foliation implicit in the equations of the theory,
need not assume that ‘realistic’ theories such as Bohmian mechanics must be
non Lorentz-invariant. The argument put forward by Hardy, aiming to show
that this is the case ([22]), was soon shown not to be as compelling as it was
thought to be (for a concise review of this discussion, see [14]). Although it
is argued that Lorentz invariance must be violated at the microlevel, albeit re-
covered at the statistical level (see e.g. [29]), there is no existing proof that
this is a logical necessity; there are on the contrary some attempts to construct
fully Lorentz invariant models of Bohmian mechanics by the introduction of
additional dynamical structure, that would allow a Lorentz invariant notion of
‘evolving configuration’ along which superluminal dependences between EPR-
Bell events would be transmitted ([25], [10]). It might be of some interest to
investigate the role that a general notion of causation might play in such models.
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5 Conclusions
In the previous sections, we have seen that the aim of characterizing an unam-
biguous notion of causation linking single space-like separated events in EPR-
Bell frameworks is not an easy one to achieve. A possible reaction to this state
of affairs might be to argue that just this kind of conceptual difficulties supports
the thesis according to which a causal view of non-locality can be sensibly inves-
tigated only in a stochastic framework, although the application of probabilistic
theories of causation to the non-locality issue is itself a controversial matter.
A general conclusion that may be drawn from the discussion above is that,
as far as ordinary quantum mechanics is concerned, we are facing a dilemma:
either the notion of causation is interpreted in such general terms so as to lose
sight of the original underlying intuition - so that we seem to do nothing but
giving a different name to the puzzle under scrutiny - or we are led to ascribe
to the special-relativistic spacetime structure a purely phenomenological status
in order to make room for a preferred spacetime foliation, with respect to which
causal relations can be univocally defined. The latter horn, moreover, is in deep
tension with the attempt of constructing a Lorentz invariant account of state
reduction, which is supposed to be exactly the process through which some of
the causally relevant properties of physical systems are actualized. If we move
to formulations of quantum theory without state reduction, standard Bohmian
mechanics has at least more serious motivations by a foundational viewpoint
for accepting a violation of Lorentz invariance, and in this case it is no surprise
that in a standard Bohmian framework we can in principle make sense of the
notion of a causation at a distance.
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